AGENCY THEORY NOTES

AGENCY THEORY NOTES

Agency refers to the relationship which submits between two parties, one
party called the principal engages another one called agent and gives
agent authority and mandate to act on the principal’s benefit. The
actions of agent are binding on the principal. In finance, stockholders
are owners of the firm and are therefore the principal. However, they
are not involved on the management of running of the firm for a number
of reasons.

  1. They may not have the necessary skills and expenditure of managing
    the firm.
  2. They may not have them to run the firm.
  3. They may be geographically dispersed to manage the firm.
  4. They may be too many to manage a single firm.

Therefore enjoy management directors who ask on their behalf the
directors are the Agents. They are given capital authority and other
resources for use or that they can generate profits on behalf of
principle stakeholders. The concept of entrusting resources with
individuals where they are expected to give an account of how the
resources are used is called stewardship. The directors/top management
are required to combine the where they have utilized he resources
entrusted. Usually a conflict of interest arises when the agents pursue
their own interest at the expense of the stockholders.

1.2 Types of Agency relationships

  1. Shareholders versus Management
  2. Shareholders versus Long-term Creditors
  3. Shareholders versus Auditors
  4. Shareholders versus Government
  5. Shareholders versus Branches

1.2.1 Shareholders versus Management
The management of a firm take some actions which are inconsistent with
the goal of shareholders of wealth maximization and this will cause a
conflict of interest.

The various causes of this conflict include the following:

  • Incentive Problem
    Top managers have a fixed salary and may not have the
    incentive/motivation to work harder in order to maximize the
    shareholders wealth. This is because, irrespective of the benefit
    they make, their records is fixed they will therefore maximize on
    leisure’s and work less. This will be against the interest of the
    shareholders hence the conflict.
  • Consumption of perks/perquisites
    Perquisites refer to the high salaries and generous fringe benefits
    which directors’ award themselves. This will take the form of
    directors’ remuneration, expensive cars, expensive holidays,
    expensive assistance, post office etc. all these will constitute an
    expense to the company and will therefore reduce the amount of
    dividend paid to ordinary shareholders and who are the true owners
    of the company. Therefore, the consumption of perks by directors is
    against the interest of shareholders as it reduces their wealth.
  • Differences in Risk Profile
    Shareholders prefer high risk; high return projects since they have
    diversified investments that is, if one firm
    or project one collapses it will have an insignificant effect on their overall wealth. Managers on the other hand, will prefer low return investment since they have a personal fear of losing their jobs in case of a given project/company collapsing. This is because managers do not have multiple jobs and can therefore not be diversified. This forces them to strive for returns for shareholders and not necessarily the maximum. This difference is risk profile is therefore a source of conflict.
  • Difference in Investment/Evaluation Horizon
    Managers prefer to undertake profit which are profitable in the
    short-term so that they can take credit when they are still in the
    company shareholders. On the other hand, prefer long-term investment
    which is consistent with the going concern concept of the firm. A
    conflict will therefore occur since directors will undertake short
    term investment against shareholders’ desire for long term
    investment projects.
  • Management Buyout
    The management may attempt to acquire the business of the principal
    (shareholders). They would do this by forming nominees companies who
    buy the shares of the company at the stock exchange. Once they get a
    majority shareholding. This is equivalent of staging a coup and
    taking over the business of the shareholders. This causes conflict
    between agency and principal.

Solutions to the preceding type of agency problem

  • Compensation plans
  • Board of Directors
  • Takeovers
  • Specialist Monitoring
  • Auditors

1.2.2 Shareholders versus Long-term Creditors
The shareholders who are the owners of the firm have the responsibility
to raise capital for the business. Where they are unable to rise, they
go to long-term creditors. These creditors will extend loans to the firm
with hopes that, they will get interest of the principal amount. In such
a situation a debt holder becomes the principal while shareholder the
agent. The interest charged will depend on the riskiness of the
borrower, the existing capital structure, asset backing as well as the
expected capital structure and the future asset structure of the firm.
Debenture traders may require security for their loan either having a
specific charge or a general charge on all the assets of the business.
Shareholders may prejudice the position of creditors hence conflict of
interest in the following ways.

  1. Disposal of assets used as collateral for the debt
    In this case, the bond holder (creditor) is exposed to more risk
    because he/she may not receive the loan given in case of liquidation
    of the firm.
  2. Assets/investment situation
    In this case, the shareholder and the bondholder will agree on a
    specific low risk project. However, this project may be substituted
    for a high risk project whose flows have a high standard deviation.
    This exposes the bond holders because should the project collapse
    they may not recover all the amounts lend.
  3. Payment of high dividends
    Dividends may be paid from the current net profit and the existing
    retained earnings. Retained earnings are an internal source of
    finance. The payment of high dividends will lead to a low level of
    capital investment and this will reduce the market value of the
    shares and the bond. Also the firm may borrow debt to finance the
    payment of the bonds, from which no returns are expected this will
    also reduce the value of the firms and the bond.
  4. Borrowing more debt capital
    A firm may borrow more debt using the same assets as collateral for
    the new debts. The value of the old debt will therefore be reduced
    if the new debt takes priority on the collateral incase of the firm
    is liquidate. This exposes the first bond holders/lenders to more risk.
  5. Under investment
    This is where the firm fails to undertake a particular project or
    fails to invest money or capital in the entire project if there is
    an expectation that, most of the returns from the project will
    benefit the bond holders. This will lead to the reduction in the
    value of the firm and subsequently in the value of the bond.

Solutions of the above type of agency problems
The Bond holders can take the following actions to protect themselves
against the actions of the shareholders:-

  • Improve restrictive debt grants
    This involves including strict terms and conditions in the loan
    agreement or bond covenant. These restrictions may include; No
    disposal of assets without permission of lenders; No payment of
    dividends from retained earnings; No borrowing of additional debts
    until the current debt capital is fully repaid or serviced. The bond
    holders may recommend the type of project to be undertaken in
    relation to the risk level of the project. Maintenance of a given
    liquidity level by the borrower as indicated by the current ratio.
    Restriction on merges and acquisitions especially where any merger
    or acquisition will change the future cash flow pattern of the borrower
  • Sinking fund provisions
    Some amounts of profits to be transferred annually into a fund for
    the purpose of the loan repayment.
  • Callability provision
    This is where the debt lender is given a lee way to demand early
    payment of the debt by the borrower. If the borrower fails to pay
    interest charges on the due date, the lender might demand the
    repayment of the due loan before the end/lapse of the repayment
    period in which case the debt is said to have been “called”.
  • Convertibility
    This will enable the lender to convert the bond into ordinary shares
    so that the bond holder becomes a shareholder
    This is particularly so if the borrower
    is unable to pay on the debt and is facing liquidation.
  • Refuse to Lend
    The bond holders may refuse to provide capital to the borrower who
    has been involved in the misuse of debt capital in the past. Such a
    borrower will not be in a position to undertake viable project due
    to lack of investment capital. Alternatively, the lender can charge
    higher rates as deterrent mechanism.
  • Representation
    The bond holder nay demand to have a representative in the board of
    directors of the borrowing company where the representative will
    oversee proper utilization of the debt capital
  • Transfer of Assets
    On provision of debt capital, the lender may demand that, the assets
    used as collateral will be transferred to the firm (legal Ownership)
    passes to the lender and upon repayment of the loan, the asset is
    transferred back to the borrower.

1.2.3 Shareholders versus Auditors
Shareholders appoint auditors to satisfy the financial statement and to
establish whether they show a true and fair view of the state of as at a
particular date. Auditors are supposed to monitor the performance of
management on behalf of the shareholders. Since auditors act on behalf
of shareholders; they become agents, while the shareholders become the
principal.

AGENCY THEORY

Auditors may prejudice the interest of shareholders, thus causing agency
problems in the following ways:

  • Colluding with the management in the performance of their duties
    whereby their independence is compromised.
  • Demanding very high audit fees although there is insignificant audit
    work due to the strong accounts in existence.
  • Issuing unqualified reports
    which might be misleading of which may make the public to lose upon
    relying on them.
  • Failure to apply professional cadre and due to diligence in the
    performance of the audit work

Solutions to the preceding agency problem

  • Firing
  • Auditors may be removed from office by shareholders at the Annual
    General Meeting (AGM).
  • Legal Action
  • Shareholders can institute legal proceedings against the auditors
    who issue misleading reports, hence leading to investment losses.
  • Disciplinary Action by the Profession governing Accounting Practice
  • The profession governing Accounting practice in the country in
    question e.g. IGPAK in Kenya can also intervene on behalf of the
    shareholders. Such may be through suspension of the auditors,
    withdrawal of the practicing certificate, fines and penalties etc.

1.2.4 Shareholders versus Government
Shareholders and by extension the company operate in the environment
using license granted by the government. The government will expect the
company to operate the business in a manner which is beneficial to the
entire economy and society. The government is the principal and the
company is the agent. The company also carries on business on behalf of
the government because the conclusive investment environment for the
company and benefits from the company inform of taxes. The company and
its shareholders may take some actions that may prejudice the
interest/position of the government as the principal.

These actions include the following:

  • Tax Evasion, this involves failure to give the accurate picture of
    the earning of the firm to minimize the tax liability.
  • Involvement in illegal business in the firm e.g. drug trafficking,
    smuggling e.t.c.
  • Lukewarm reception to social responsibility calls by the government.
  • Lack of adequate interest in the safety of employees and the
    products and services of the company including lack of environment
    awareness concerns by the firms.
  • Avoiding certain types and areas of investment as encouraged by the
    government through incentives so that investment can be done in such
    areas.

Solutions to the preceding agency problem
The government can take the following actions to protect itself and its
interest.

  • Incurring monitoring costs
    For example the government will incur costs associated with
    statutory audits, investigation of company’s under company’s Act,
    back duty in the investigation cost to recover tax evaded in the
    past and VAT refund audits.
  • Opening investment incentives
    To encourage investments in given areas and locations, the
    government offers incentives in form of capital allowance laid down
    in the second schedule of Cap 470.
  • Legislations
    The government has provided a legal framework to govern the
    operations of the company and provide protection to certain people
    in the society e.g. regulations associated to disclosure of
    information, minimum wages and salaries, environmental protection
    e.t.c., guidelines on minimum disclosure in financial statements

1.2.5 Head Office versus Branch
Multi-national companies have diverse operations set up in different
geographical locations. The head office will Act as the Principal and
the subsidiary will act as the Agent. The subsidiary will pursue their
own goals, hence creating an agency relationship.
These conflicts can be resolved in the following ways:-

  • Frequent transfer of managers
  • Adopting a global strategic planning to ensure better communication
    of its vision.
  • Having a voluntary code of Ethical practices to guide the brand
    management.
  • An elaborate performance reporting system providing a two way
    feedback mechanism.
  • Performance contracts for managers with commensurate compensation
    package for the same.